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About This Report 
This report was produced at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Center 
for Economic Development (UWMCED), a unit of the College of Letters and 
Science at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. The College established 
UWMCED in 1990, with the assistance of a grant from the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Economic Development Administration’s “University Center” 
program, to provide university research and technical assistance to community 
organizations and units of government working to improve the Greater 
Milwaukee economy. In 2000, UWMCED also became part of UWM’s 
“Milwaukee Idea,” as one of the core units of the “Consortium for Economic 
Opportunity.” The analysis and conclusions presented in this report are solely 
those of UWMCED and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of UW-
Milwaukee or the U.S. Department of Commerce. 
The author of this report is Dr. Marc V. Levine, director of UWMCED. 
Lauren McHargue, senior policy analyst at UWMCED, as well as Chieko Maene, 
Ryan Ranker, and Katherine Levine, research assistants at the Center, provided 
indispensable assistance. 
UWMCED strongly believes that informed public debate is vital to the 
development of good public policy. The Center publishes briefing papers, 
detailed analyses of economic trends and policies, and “technical assistance” 
reports on issues of applied economic development. In these ways, as well as in 
conferences and public lectures sponsored by the Center, we hope to contribute to 
public discussion of economic development policy in Southeastern Wisconsin. 
Further information about the Center and its reports and activities is available 
at our web site: www.ced.uwm.edu 
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Executive Summary 
 
As we approach Labor Day 2003, the economic boom of the 1990s has 
already become a distant memory for Milwaukee’s labor market. Through most 
of the 1990s, the unemployment rate for city residents ran below or close to the 
national average for the nation’s 50 largest cities. Today, at 9.3 percent, 
Milwaukee’s unemployment rate is over two percentage points higher than the 
national ‘big city” average, and significantly higher than the 5.7 percent 
unemployment rate at which it began the 1990s. In 2003, among the nation’s 50 
largest cities, Milwaukee had the 44th highest unemployment rate. Only 
Cleveland, Detroit, Fresno, Miami, Oakland, and San Jose posted higher rates. 
Since 1990, Milwaukee has lost 21 percent of its manufacturing jobs and 
overall job growth has been anemic compared to other cities. Major public 
investments in tourism and entertainment facilities, such as the Midwest Airlines 
convention center and Miller Park, have failed to produce the job boom –in either 
tourism-related employment or “spin off” jobs—forecast by promoters. 
The unemployment rate in the city of Milwaukee runs over five percentage 
points higher than in the suburbs, a gap that has widened considerably since the 
mid-1990s. All of the net job growth in metropolitan Milwaukee since 1995 has 
occurred in the suburbs. Consequently, the metro Milwaukee labor market 
continues to suffer from a structural “spatial mismatch” between pockets of high 
unemployment (the city of Milwaukee) and locations of job growth (mainly, the 
suburbs).    
In Milwaukee’s inner city, joblessness is endemic. 56.4 percent of working 
age males in the city’s “Enterprise Community” –census tracts designated as the 
“inner city” by City Hall—were either unemployed or not in the labor force. By 
2000, in almost one-third of the census tracts in the city of Milwaukee, over half 
the working age male population was unemployed or not in the labor force. 
UWM Center for Economic Development 4
Racial disparities in unemployment continue to characterize the Milwaukee 
labor market. Among the cities and metropolitan areas surveyed by the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Milwaukee had the highest rates of black 
unemployment (18.5% in the city, 17.4% in the metro area) in 2001, the most 
recent data available. The gap in white and black unemployment rates in 
Milwaukee was among the largest in the nation; in metro Milwaukee, the black 
unemployment rate was over four times higher than the white rate in 2001. In the 
city of Milwaukee in 2001, according to “supplementary survey” data released by 
the U.S. Bureau of the Census, white male teenagers (ages 16-19) had a lower 
unemployment rate (17.9%) than prime working-age (25-54) black males 
(18.6%). 
The “stealth depression” in the city of Milwaukee’s labor market calls for 
bold, new departures in public policy. Initiatives in public investment, regional 
cooperation, reducing metro-wide racial segregation, industrial policy, and 
community benefits agreements should be considered as part of an aggressive 
anti-unemployment strategy in the city. 
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Introduction 
As we approach Labor Day 2003, celebrations in the city of Milwaukee 
should be tempered by a stark reality: This city is in the midst of its most severe 
employment crisis in two decades. Despite the economic boom of the 1990s, the 
surge in downtown redevelopment, and claims by city leaders that businesses are 
rediscovering the “competitive advantages” of Milwaukee’s inner city, 
joblessness among city residents has risen sharply since 1999. Milwaukee’s 
unemployment rate ran consistently below the average for the nation’s largest 
cities through the mid-1990s. By 2003, however, Milwaukee’s unemployment of 
9.3 percent far exceeded the national urban average, and was well above the 5.7 
percent unemployment rate at which it began the 1990s. 
For black residents of Milwaukee, the employment situation is particularly 
grim. Despite significant employment gains at the end of the 1990s economic 
boom, by 2001 black unemployment in the city was higher than it was in 1990. In 
many neighborhoods in Milwaukee’s predominantly black inner city, joblessness 
is so pervasive that over 50 percent of working age males are either unemployed 
or not even in the labor force. Unemployment among Milwaukee blacks remains 
higher than for blacks in any large city in the United States. In short, for black 
Milwaukeeans, the current employment crisis is nothing short of a “stealth 
depression.” 
Drawing on the latest data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, this report will document the key dimensions of 
Milwaukee’s current employment crisis, placing the city in national and regional 
context. In addition, we will examine patterns of joblessness in the city’s 
neighborhoods as well as the city’s deep racial disparities in employment. 
Finally, we will discuss some of the policy implications of these findings. Despite 
the severity of Milwaukee’s employment crisis, there are few signs that the city’s 
political and corporate leadership recognizes the “stealth depression” that now 
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grips the city’s labor market, or understands that current strategies have failed to 
attack pervasive joblessness in Milwaukee. As the 2004 political season moves 
into high gear, surely no issue will be more important than developing new and 
innovative policies to generate family-supporting jobs in the city of Milwaukee. 
Rising Unemployment in Milwaukee 
Since the Mid-1990s 
Throughout the 1990s, the official unemployment rate in the city of 
Milwaukee oscillated between 5.1 and 5.7 percent, except for the recession-
influenced years of the 1991-1994 period when unemployment climbed as high 
as 6.5 percent. Moreover, as Table 1 and Chart 1 illustrate, through 1996, annual 
average unemployment in Milwaukee remained below the average of the nation’s 
fifty largest cities. Despite severe deindustrialization that cost Milwaukee over 46 
percent of its manufacturing jobs between 1972 and 1992, the city’s employment 
performance through the mid-1990s stacked up rather favorably compared to 
trends in the nation’s largest cities. 
Table 1: 
Unemployment in Milwaukee in National Perspective: 1990-2003  
Average Annual Unemployment Rates in the City of Milwaukee and  
the Nation’s Fifty Largest Cities 
Year City of 
Milwaukee 
National Average: 
50 Largest Cities 
Gap –Milwaukee vs. the 
National Average 
1990 5.7 6.0 -0.3 
1991 6.5 7.1 -0.6 
1992 6.2 7.9 -1.7 
1993 6.4 7.5 -1.1 
1994 6.5 6.7 -0.2 
1995 5.1 6.1 -1.0 
1996 5.3 5.7 -0.4 
1997 5.7 5.4 +0.3 
1998 5.3 5.0 +0.3 
1999 5.4 4.7 +0.7 
2000 6.6 4.5 +2.1 
2001 7.8 5.4 +2.4 
2002 9.6 6.9 +2.7 
2003* 9.3 6.9 +2.4 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics, 1990-2003. Average annual unemployment 
rate for cities. 
*May 2003 unemployment rates 
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Chart 1: 
 
Rising Unemployment in Milwaukee: 
The City versus the National Urban Average, 1990-2003
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Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics, 1990-2003. Average annual unemployment rate 
for cities. 
 
 
After 1996, however, troubles in Milwaukee’s labor market emerged in two 
phases. First, between 1996-1999, although Milwaukee’s unemployment rate 
remained steady, the national “big city” unemployment rate continued to drop as 
the 1990s boom rolled on. Thus, after 1996, the pattern of the early 1990s 
reversed itself and Milwaukee’s unemployment rate began consistently 
surpassing the national urban average. The lines on Chart 1 show a small but 
discernible gap opening up between unemployment in Milwaukee and the 
national big city average between 1996-1999.  
During the second phase of Milwaukee’s employment crisis, between 1999-
2003, this gap turned into a yawning chasm. Between 1999-2000, unemployment 
rose precipitously in Milwaukee while most big cities continued to enjoy the 
benefits of the 1990s boom and saw their unemployment rates continue to 
decline. Consequently, Milwaukee’s unemployment rate, which was only 0.7 
percent higher than the national urban average in 1999, soared to 2.1 percentage 
points higher in 2000. As Table 1 shows, as recently as 1995, Milwaukee’s 
unemployment rate had been a full percentage point below the national “big city” 
average. Since 2000, however, Milwaukee’s unemployment rate has outdistanced 
the national “big city” average by more than two percentage points in every year; 
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in the most recent annual measure (2002), Milwaukee’s rate was 2.7 percentage 
points higher than the national average. 
The city’s underperforming labor market can be clearly discerned in Table 2, 
which shows Milwaukee’s ranking since 1990, by unemployment rate, among the 
nation’s 50 largest cities. Through 1995, Milwaukee’s unemployment rate ranked 
a respectable 21st among the 50 largest cities (ranked lowest to highest). 
However, through the rest of the decade, Milwaukee’s rank plummeted as 
unemployment remained steady here while it continued to fall in big cities across 
the United States. After 1999, Milwaukee’s rank fell even further, as 
unemployment increased much more precipitously here than in other large cities. 
Consequently, by 2003, Milwaukee ranked 44th among the 50 largest cities; only 
Cleveland, Detroit, Fresno, Miami, Oakland, and San Jose had higher 
unemployment rates through May 2003.  
Table 2: 
Milwaukee’s Rank Among the Nation’s Fifty Largest Cities In Unemployment Rate, 1990-2003 
 
Cities ranked from lowest unemployment to highest (i.e. 1st would 
signify city with the lowest unemployment rate) 
  
Year Milwaukee’s Rank 
 
1990 27 
1991 25 
1992 16 
1993 18 
1994 26 
1995 21 
1996 27 
1997 32 
1998 32 
1999 35 
2000 44 
2001 43 
2002 44 
2003* 44 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics, 1990-2003. 
Average annual unemployment rate for cities.  
*May 2003 unemployment rates 
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These trends all point to a sharp rise in joblessness among residents of the city 
of Milwaukee since the late-1990s. Between the end of 1997 and May 2003, the 
number of employed city residents declined by 10.2 percent (from 276,675 to 
248,227). During that same period, the number of unemployed Milwaukeeans 
increased by 53 percent (from 16,620 to 25,409). The rise in unemployment has 
been even steeper since 1999 – in less than four years, the number of unemployed 
residents in the city of Milwaukee has jumped by over 11,000, almost an 80 
percent increase.  The bottom line is this: despite the economic boom of the 
1990s, by 2003 the unemployment rate in the city of Milwaukee (9.3 percent) was 
significantly higher than it was in 1990 (5.7 percent), before the boom began.   
In short, by any reckoning, there has been a breathtaking collapse of the city 
of Milwaukee’s labor market since the mid-1990s, particularly after 1999. 
Ironically, it has been during this period that two major public investments in 
tourism and entertainment in the city went into operation: the Midwest Airlines 
convention center and Miller Park. In addition, after 2000, two major privately 
funded projects promising tourism benefits opened: the Potawatomi Casino, and 
the Calatrava wing of the art museum. Representing well over $1 billion in 
investment, these projects were all touted as prodigious job-creators in 
themselves, and, through the “multiplier effect,” generators of thousands of “spin 
off” jobs not only in tourism but other sectors of the local economy. 
Clearly, the aggregate employment and unemployment figures for the city of 
Milwaukee show that the tourism strategy has failed to produce the job-boom 
forecast by the “economic impact” studies commissioned in support of projects 
such as Miller Park or the convention center. Moreover, as Chart 2 shows, these 
investments have curiously failed to produce an employment boom even in the 
tourism sector. Despite over $1 billion in tourism, sports, and entertainment 
investments since the late 1990s, employment in hotels in the city of Milwaukee 
was 25 percent lower in 2000 than it was ten years earlier! These are the most 
recent sectoral data available, but it is highly unlikely –in the wake of the 2001 
recession and the aftermath of 9/11—that hotel employment has climbed 
significantly since then. In short, the boom in tourism and entertainment 
investment since the late 1990s has been a bust in terms of its impact on the city’s 
labor market. 
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Chart 2: 
Hotel Employment in the City of Milwaukee, 1991-2000
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Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, State of the Cities Data System. 
Special extracts from U.S. Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns 
 
Beyond the failure of tourism to deliver jobs in the city, what else contributed 
to the deterioration of Milwaukee’s labor market? Given Milwaukee’s history as 
an industrial center, researchers often focus on deindustrialization, and the loss of 
almost 60 percent of the city’s manufacturing jobs since the early 1970s has 
unquestionably placed heavy pressures on the local labor market. And clearly, as 
Table 3 shows, heavy job losses at major Milwaukee-area manufacturers during 
the 1990s  --particularly plant closings and layoffs at Johnson Controls, Miller 
Brewing, Briggs and Stratton, Tower Automotive, Delco Electronics, Rockwell, 
Harnischfeger, and Master Lock—were a central part of the city’s late-1990s 
labor market collapse.1 
                                                 
1 Although several employers, including non-manufacturers such as Aurora Health Care, Wisconsin Energy, and M& I Corp., as 
well as manufacturers such as Harley-Davidson saw strong employment growth between 1990-2003, it is unclear: a) how much 
of this growth occurred in the city of Milwaukee; and b) how many of these jobs were held by city residents. 
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Table 3: 
Local Employment at Selected Milwaukee-Area Companies, 1990-2003 
Total Employment 
Company 1990 2003 
Briggs and Stratton 8000 2600 
Aurora Health Care 5400 11,704 
Wisconsin Bell/SBC Ameritech 4527 4500 
Allen-Bradley/Rockwell 4500 4800 
A.O. Smith/Tower Automotive 3986 1300 
Firstar 3575 3500 
GM-Delco Electronics 3600 1600 
Marcus Corporation 3500 3027 
Marshall & Ilsley Corp. 3000 6700 
Miller Brewing 3212 1850 
Wisconsin Energy Corp. 3020 5100 
Northwestern Mutual 3000 4000 
Johnson Controls 2500 2500 
Harnischfeger/Joy Global 2500 900 
Ladish 2000 925 
Master Lock 1480 750 
Harley-Davidson 1200 3500 
Source: Milwaukee Business Journal, Book of Lists. List of largest Milwaukee Area private 
employers,1990 and 2003. 
But, deindustrialization, by itself, does not explain why Milwaukee’s 
unemployment soared past all but a handful of the nation’s largest cities after the 
mid-1990s. As Table 4 shows, when compared to other big cities in the 
Northeast-Midwest “industrial belt,” Milwaukee’s manufacturing job losses 
during the 1990s –while substantial—were not the most severe. Overall job 
growth in the Milwaukee, however, was anemic when compared to these other 
cities: only Buffalo, Cleveland, and Detroit, with actual job losses in the 1990s, 
had a slower job growth rate than Milwaukee. During the 1990s, beyond the 
ongoing crisis in local manufacturing facing all historically-industrial cities, 
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Milwaukee’s economy stopped producing enough jobs of any type to keep 
unemployment among city residents from rising. And when we add to this 
situation the likelihood that a large share of the city jobs that were created in the 
1990s went to suburban commuters (see below), we begin to understand why 
unemployment among city of Milwaukee residents rose so precipitously at the 
end of the 1990s. 
Table 4: 
Job Growth in the 1990s: Milwaukee Compared to Other Industrial Cities  
City % change in mfg. jobs, 
1991-2000 
% change in total 
jobs, 1991-2000 
Baltimore -26.9 +0.6 
Boston -10.7 +18.1 
Buffalo -24.3 -8.6 
Chicago -26.1 +4.4 
Cincinnati -35.3 +1.4 
Cleveland -27.8 -0.4 
Columbus 10.7 +26.4 
Detroit -13.4 -5.0 
Milwaukee -21.4 +0.4 
Minneapolis -18.6 +0.5 
Philadelphia -29.3 +1.1 
Pittsburgh -21.3 +2.2 
St. Louis -31.7 +4.8 
Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, State of the Cities Data System. Special 
extracts from U.S. Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns 
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Regional Polarization and the Milwaukee 
Labor Market Since 1990 
When it comes to employment and unemployment, metro Milwaukee really 
contains two labor markets: one in the city, the other in the suburbs. As Chart 3 
shows, unemployment rates in the city and suburbs in metro Milwaukee have 
diverged sharply since the early 1990s. Although the unemployment rate for 
suburban residents has consistently been lower than the city average, after 1996 
the city-suburban gap widened considerably. Unemployment did increase in the 
suburbs of Milwaukee, Waukesha, Ozaukee, and Washington counties with the 
end of the 1990s boom, the recession of 2001, and the post-2001 “jobless 
recovery.” But the city’s unemployment rate grew even more rapidly, so that a 
3.0 percent gap between the city and suburbs in 1996 swelled to a 5.5 percent gap 
in 2002. In May 2003, the city of Milwaukee, with 33.5 percent of metro 
Milwaukee’s labor force, was home to 53.7 percent of the region’s unemployed.  
Chart 3: 
A Growing City-Suburban Gap in Joblessness Since 1990
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Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics, 1990-2003. Average annual 
unemployment rate for cities.  *May 2003 unemployment rates.  **WOW Suburbs include Waukesha, 
Ozaukee, and Washington counties 
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This city-suburb unemployment gap is a symptom of a larger structural 
problem in the Greater Milwaukee labor market: a “spatial mismatch” between 
pockets of high unemployment (the city of Milwaukee) and locations of job 
growth (mainly, the suburbs). As Table 5 shows, during the crucial period 
between 1995-2000, when the employment situation for city of Milwaukee 
residents began to deteriorate, all of the net job growth in metropolitan 
Milwaukee occurred in the suburbs. During this period, the number of jobs in the 
suburbs grew by 52,496 while the total number of jobs in the city of Milwaukee 
declined by 678. Thus, by the end of the 1990s, job growth was occurring in 
areas of metropolitan Milwaukee some distance from the neighborhoods where 
most of the city’s unemployed live, and in places often inaccessible by public 
transportation on which many city job seekers depend. 
Table 5: 
The Geography of Employment Growth in Metropolitan Milwaukee, 1995-2000 
 
Location Change in # of jobs 
 
City of Milwaukee (all) -678 
Downtown +7331 
Rest of City - 8009 
Suburbs (all) +52,496 
 
Sources: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, State of the Cities Data System. 
Special extracts from U.S. Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns; U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, County Business Patterns. Zip-code level jobs data, 1995-2000.  
 
As Table 5 also shows, there was a sharp geographic variation in the late 
1990s in job growth within the city of Milwaukee. Downtown Milwaukee gained 
over 7,300 jobs between 1995-2000, while the rest of the city –buffeted by 
layoffs and plant closings at Johnson Controls, Tower Automotive, Master Lock, 
and Miller Brewing, to name just a few—shed over 8,000 jobs. But, for residents 
in Milwaukee’s neighborhoods, these job gains downtown and losses in the rest 
of the city did not “balance out.”  
Although we will not know precisely until U.S. Census Bureau “journey to 
work” data are released later this year, the evidence suggests that a large share of 
the new downtown jobs were garnered by suburban commuters, not by city 
residents displaced from employment by plant shutdowns and layoffs. According 
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to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the number of employed city residents 
declined by 20,941 between 1995-2000 (see Table 6); on the other hand, the 
number of employed suburban residents grew by 47,165. Since: 1) 52,496 jobs 
were created in the suburbs during this period; and 2) we can safely assume that 
non-suburbanites garnered some of these jobs2; then 3) to account for the increase 
in 47,165 employed residents in the Milwaukee suburbs, it is reasonable to infer 
that the lion’s share of the increased number in jobs in downtown Milwaukee 
during this period was secured by residents from outside the city3.  
In an otherwise bleak employment picture for the city since the mid-1990s, 
downtown Milwaukee stands as one of the bright spots. And, the fact that 
downtown is providing significant employment for suburban commuters is not, in 
itself, a negative trend; a healthy downtown is vital to maintaining the place of 
the city of Milwaukee in the regional economy.  But, there is little evidence that 
downtown job growth since the late 1990s has provided significant employment 
opportunities for city residents or made a meaningful dent in the regional “spatial 
mismatch” that plagues the Milwaukee labor market. 
Table 6: 
Geographic Variation in the Number of Employed Residents in Metro Milwaukee, 1995-2000 
Place Change in # of employed 
residents 
 
City of Milwaukee -20,941 
Milwaukee County Suburbs +26,173 
WOW Counties +20,992 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics, 1995-2000. 
 
Joblessness in Milwaukee’s Inner City 
Neighborhoods 
The consequence of this continuing and deepening “spatial mismatch” in the 
regional labor market has been a “stealth depression” in the labor markets of 
                                                 
2 Including not only some city residents, but also workers from outside the metropolitan area, from places such as Dodge, 
Jefferson, Racine, and Walworth counties. 
3 An in-depth study of downtown redevelopment in Milwaukee during the 1980s found that 49.2 percent of all jobs created 
downtown went to suburbanites, and that 80 percent of all downtown jobs paying more than $40,000 annually (in 1992 $) were 
secured by suburban commuters. See Marc V. Levine and John F. Zipp, Downtown redevelopment in Milwaukee: Has it 
delivered for the city? (Milwaukee: UWM Center for Economic Development, 1994).  
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many Milwaukee neighborhoods.  The most recent available data on employment 
and unemployment at the neighborhood-level comes from the 2000 census, and 
these data reveal that a pervasive crisis of joblessness continues to grip 
Milwaukee’s inner city.  During the 1990s, there was some improvement in an 
unemployment situation that had reached rock bottom during the disastrous 
1980s (between 1977-1992, Milwaukee lost almost 38 percent of its 
manufacturing jobs).  In a slight majority of inner city neighborhoods, 
unemployment declined modestly during the 1990s, although by any measure 
rates remained stubbornly high. In the city’s “Enterprise Community” --the 
census tracts in the heart of Milwaukee officially designated by City Hall as “the 
inner city”-- the unemployment rate dropped from 27.8 percent to 22.2 percent 
between 1990-2000. In ten of the city’s 17 “NSP” (“Neighborhood Strategic 
Planning”) areas, unemployment declined during the 1990s. (See Table 7). 
 Table 7: 
          Unemployment in Milwaukee’s Inner City: 1970-2000 
%  of civilian labor force unemployed in NSP Areas 
NSP#  Neighborhood 
 
1970 
 
1980 
 
1990 2000 
1 Parklawn 3.4 5.3 15.7 13.3 
2 Northwest 3.7 8.4 11.8 13.6 
3 Lincoln Park 2.5 9.4 8.9 13.5 
4 United Community 6.7 13.4 17.1 19.3 
5 Sherman Park 2.8 5.7 9.1 10.1 
6 Harambee 7.4 16.3 22.2 22.0 
7 Riverwest 4.5 8.1 10.8 9.1 
8 Metcalfe Park 6.4 14.1 22.9 20.9 
9 Midtown 9.5 16.2 30.4 21.1 
10 Waico/YMCA 7.5 14.6 28.6 25.0 
11 Grandview/Walnut Hill 5.4 11.2 20.6 22.4 
12 Mid-Town 10.4 16.0 34.1 24.9 
13 Hillside/Lapham 7.6 23.8 40.8 23.2 
14 West Side 5.8 10.0 15.9 15.3 
15 Greater Clarke Square 5.3 6.7 9.0 13.0 
16 Near South Side 4.8 10.9 16.1 13.7 
17 Historic South Side 4.0 8.5 10.4 12.7 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census 2000 Summary File (SF3). Employment Status for the 
Population16 Years and Over. 
 
However, these improvements were less meaningful than they appeared. In 
neighborhoods outside the traditional inner city, such as the Northwest Side, 
Lincoln Park, and Sherman Park, unemployment rose between 1990-2000. In 
short, rather than representing any genuine gains in the inner city labor market, 
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the “improved” unemployment rate in many inner city neighborhoods merely 
represented a geographic “rearranging” of unemployment, with a slight reduction 
in unemployment in the traditional “inner core” amid sharp increases in 
neighborhoods to the north and west. Emblematic of this trend of the “expanding 
inner city” was the sharp deterioration in the employment situation in Lincoln 
Park, a neighborhood north of traditional inner city. Once home to thousands of 
employees of A.O. Smith, American Motors, and other northside manufacturers, 
Lincoln Park saw its unemployment rate climb by over 50 percent during the 
1990s (rising from 8.9 to 13.5 percent). 
These unemployment numbers are serious enough. Unfortunately, however, 
they do not reveal the true extent to which work has disappeared from daily life 
in many Milwaukee neighborhoods. For example, the unemployment rate does 
not include people who have stopped looking for work (“discouraged job-
seekers”) or are otherwise not in the civilian labor force. Thus, a better measure 
of the availability of work in Milwaukee’s inner city is the indicator of “labor 
market exclusion.” This measure calculates the proportion of the working age 
population (over 16 years old) that is either unemployed or not in the civilian 
labor force (in school, not looking for work, disabled, or in prison). 
As Table 8 illustrates, labor market exclusion has reached staggering proportions 
in Milwaukee’s inner city. This table presents labor market exclusion rates for 
males in inner city neighborhoods between 1980 and 2000. This breakdown 
enables us to more precisely analyze changes in inner city work opportunities 
since 1980 by controlling for the increases in labor force participation by women 
that have occurred since then. The results are astounding: in 2000, in all but two 
city “NSP” neighborhoods, over 40 percent of the working age males were either 
unemployed or not in the labor force; in seven of the city’s “NSP Areas,” the 
male labor market exclusion rate was well over 50 percent. For the city’s 
“Enterprise Community” as a whole, 56.4 percent of working age males were 
unemployed or outside the labor force. Given our analysis earlier of trends in the 
Milwaukee labor market since 2000, there is little question that these figures have 
worsened over the past three years. 
Chart 4 further sharpens the focus on the employment crisis in Milwaukee’s 
inner city. This graph looks at levels labor market exclusion for prime working 
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age males --those between the ages of 25-54-- in two important inner city 
neighborhoods, and, for comparative purposes, the city of Milwaukee as a whole, 
and Milwaukee’s suburbs. The census tracts along Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
Drive and in the Metcalfe Park area around 27th and North are prime 
redevelopment zones in Milwaukee’s inner city. King Drive, in particular, is 
often cited by city officials and in the media as a redevelopment “success story,” 
as an example of how “market-driven” commercial redevelopment can revive an 
inner city neighborhood. 
Yet, as Chart 4 shows, joblessness remains endemic among prime working 
age males in these two inner city neighborhoods. Despite the overall economic 
boom of the 1990s, as well as intensive city promotion of both areas as 
“competitive inner city” neighborhoods, by 2000 well over half the prime 
working age males around 27th and North, and over 40 percent of prime working 
age males in the King Drive census tracts, remained unemployed or out of the 
labor force. The labor market exclusion rate around 27th and North is double the 
city-wide rate, and almost six times the rate for prime working age males in the 
suburbs of Milwaukee, Waukesha, Washington, and Ozaukee counties. By any 
reckoning, this is an employment crisis of major proportions. 
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Table 8: 
Labor Market Exclusion in Milwaukee’s “NSP” Areas 
(% of working age males either unemployed or not in the civilian labor force, 1980-2000)  
 
 NSP 
# 
 
 
NEIGHBORHOOD  
 
 
1980 
 
 
1990 
 
 
2000 
 
 
1 Parklawn 31.0 40.5 41.2
2 Northwest 30.9 35.5 48.2
3 Lincoln Park 31.6 35.4 48.2
4 United Community 41.5 47.6 59.1
5 Sherman Park 30.2 30.7 39.0
6 Harambee 45.9 53.1 54.7
7 Riverwest 32.6 34.4 34.6
8 Metcalfe Park 40.4 51.7 57.9
9 Midtown 46.7 62.3 58.9
10 WAICO/YMCA 51.1 56.5 60.7
11 Grandview/Walnut Hill 34.2 50.9 54.9
12 Mid-Town 48.7 62.3 60.7
13 Hillside/Lapham 69.7 81.6 69.1
14 West Side 45.7 50.8 49.1
15 Greater Clarke Square 30.4 35.2 44.1
16 Near South Side 38.3 42.3 38.6
17 Historic South Side 30.3 32.7 43.0
 Source: Same as Table 7. 
 
 
 
Chart 4: 
 
Source:  Same as Table 7 
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Chart 5 and Table 9 provide a final overview of the pervasiveness of 
joblessness in Milwaukee’s inner city. As Table 9 shows, the number of census 
tracts in the city of Milwaukee in which 50 percent or more of working age males 
are unemployed or not in the labor force has grown dramatically since 1970. In 
1970, there were only seven tracts in the city in which the majority of working 
age males was jobless; by 2000, almost 30 percent of the city’s census tracts (62 
of 218) fell into conditions of “majority joblessness” for males. It is no 
exaggeration to say that for males in broad swaths of Milwaukee’s inner city, 
work has “disappeared,” to borrow the expression of Harvard sociologist William 
Julius Wilson.  
Table 9: 
Joblessness in the Inner City: 
The Number of Milwaukee Census Tracts in Which the Majority of Working-Age 
Males were Jobless, 1970-2000 
Year # of “majority 
jobless” tracts 
1970 7 
1980 25 
1990 44 
2000 62 
 
Chart 5 offers a dramatic, decade-by-decade mapping of spreading 
joblessness in Milwaukee’s neighborhoods between 1970 and 2000.  By 1990, as 
the map shows, most of the city’s north side and a broad swath of the near south 
side contained “majority jobless” census tracts. By 2000, as noted earlier, 
conditions of “majority joblessness” had spread well to the north of Milwaukee’s 
traditional core, into portions of Lincoln Creek, Sherman Park, and towards the 
far Northwest Side. In short, despite the economic boom of the 1990s, the 
“stealth depression” remained unchecked in Milwaukee’s inner city. 
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Chart 5: 
 Labor Market Exclusion in Milwaukee, 1970-2000: 
Census tracts in which 50% or more of working age males are  
unemployed or not in the labor force 
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Racial Disparities and Joblessness in 
Milwaukee 
 
 “Stealth depression,” is surely an apt characterization for the employment 
situation facing the city’s African American community. Indeed, some might 
argue that the city’s labor market for blacks has been in a “stealth depression” for 
almost thirty years. When Milwaukee’s industrial economy began collapsing in 
the late 1970s, black unemployment soared, reaching 28.3 percent in 1985, 
according to BLS estimates. Things improved somewhat toward the end of the 
1980s, so that by 1990, the black unemployment rate in the city stood at 16.6 
percent, still among the highest black unemployment rates for any city in the 
country. What’s more, the black unemployment rate in metro Milwaukee was 
four times higher than white rate, a racial disparity twice the national average.4 
As Chart 6 shows, after spiking again during the early 1990s recession and 
peaking at 23.9 percent, the black unemployment rate in the city of Milwaukee 
oscillated between 14 and 18 percent throughout the 1990s. Between 1999 and 
2000, though, as the national economic boom reached its apex, black 
unemployment in Milwaukee fell precipitously, reaching 9.7 percent, the lowest 
level in over thirty years.5  
These gains, however, were fragile and fleeting. By 2001, according to the 
most recent data available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), black 
unemployment in the city had surged back to 18.5 percent, erasing all of the gains 
of the 1990s boom. This post-2000 surge in black joblessness in Milwaukee 
mirrors national trends in which “unemployment among blacks is rising at a 
faster pace than in any similar period since the mid-1970s,” according to BLS 
data.6 
                                                 
4 See Marc Levine, The Economic State of Milwaukee: The City and the Region, 1998 (Milwaukee: UWM Center for Economic 
Development, 1998), pp.79-81. 
5 This was a particularly impressive gain because, as we have seen (Chart 1), between 1999-2000 was when overall 
unemployment in the city began rising (in advance of the national recession of 2001). However, we should also caution that 
there is an error range in the BLS estimates, so that this figure may have been as low as 6.3% or as high as 13.1% (more likely 
towards the upper end of the error range, given black unemployment rates throughout the 1990s and in 2001).   
6 Louis Uchitelle, “Blacks lose better jobs faster as middle-class work drops,” The New York Times, 12 July 2003. 
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Chart 6: 
Black Unemployment in the City of Milwaukee,
1990-2001
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.  Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment: 
Estimates for metropolitan areas and cities, 1990-2001. 
 
Although the increase in black unemployment in Milwaukee after 2000 is 
consistent with national trends, Milwaukee’s black unemployment rate remains 
far above the national average and far higher than in all cities surveyed by the 
BLS. Moreover, with the exception of Baltimore and Washington, D.C. (which 
had exceptionally low white unemployment rates in 2001), Milwaukee had the 
highest racial disparity in unemployment rates of any city surveyed by the BLS. 
And the percentage point gap separating the black and white unemployment rates 
in Milwaukee is the largest among the BLS-reported cities. Table 10 presents 
these 2001 data for the cities reported by the BLS.  
Table 11 presents these data for metropolitan areas surveyed by the BLS. In 
2001, as is customarily the case, BLS surveyed the employment situation in more 
metropolitan areas than cities; thus, looking at these metro area data gives us a 
slightly larger sample of urbanized areas against which to benchmark the racial 
dynamics of the Milwaukee labor market. The metro area data also give an 
indication of how much “spatial mismatches” and racial segregation affect 
unemployment rates: in areas in which blacks have little access to the suburban 
labor market, we would expect metro area racial disparities in unemployment to 
be higher than racial disparities in the city itself. 
In hypersegregated Milwaukee, where 92 percent of the metro area’s black 
labor force lives in the city, and 79 percent of the region’s white labor force lives 
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in the suburbs7, this is precisely the case. Racial disparities in unemployment here 
are even more apparent at the metropolitan area level than at the city level. 
Milwaukee has, by far, the highest black unemployment rate among metropolitan 
areas surveyed by the BLS, and, by far, the largest racial gap in unemployment 
rates. The black unemployment rate in metro Milwaukee remains over four times 
higher than the white rate. 
Table 10: 
Racial Disparities in Unemployment in Selected Central Cities: 2001Unemployment Rate 
City Black White Black/White 
Ratio 
Black-
White 
% Gap 
Baltimore 9.3 2.1 4.43 7.2 
Chicago 12.2 5.5 2.22 6.7 
Cleveland 7.3 4.0 1.83 3.3 
Dallas 13.0 5.5 2.36 7.5 
Detroit 11.1 9.3 1.19 1.8 
Houston 9.7 3.5 2.77 6.2 
Indianapolis 5.3 4.4 1.20 0.9 
Los Angeles 10.7 6.2 1.73 4.5 
Milwaukee 18.5 6.7 2.76 11.8 
New York 8.4 5.2 1.62 3.2 
Philadelphia 10.1 7.1 1.42 3.0 
St. Louis 10.9 6.7 1.63 4.2 
Washington, 
D.C. 
9.1 3.0 3.03 6.1 
Source: Same as Chart 6 
                                                 
7 Calculated from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census 2000 Summary File (SF3). Employment Status for the Population16 Years 
and Over.  
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Table 11: 
Racial Disparities in Unemployment in Selected Metropolitan Areas:  
2001 Unemployment Rate 
City Black White Black/White 
Ratio 
Black-White 
% Gap 
Atlanta 5.3 2.5 2.12 2.8 
Baltimore 7.9 3.0 2.63 4.9 
Boston 6.2 3.3 1.88 2.9 
Buffalo 13.5 4.3 3.14 9.2 
Charlotte 9.9 4.4 2.25 5.4 
Chicago 9.9 4.6 2.15 5.3 
Cincinnati 4.7 3.1 1.52 1.6 
Cleveland 6.4 3.3 1.94 3.1 
Columbus 5.1 3.2 1.59 1.9 
Detroit 9.6 4.5 2.13 5.1 
Houston 8.7 3.8 2.29 4.9 
Kansas City 11.0 4.1 2.68 6.9 
Los Angeles 10.0 5.3 1.73 4.5 
Louisville 7.0 3.6 1.94 3.4 
Memphis 5.6 4.3 1.30 1.3 
Miami 6.1 6.1 1.00 -- 
Milwaukee 17.4 4.1 4.24 13.3 
Minneapolis 9.2 3.1 2.97 6.1 
New Orleans 8.4 2.9 2.90 5.5 
New York 8.1 4.6 1.76 3.5 
Oakland 7.3 3.5 2.09 3.8 
Philadelphia 9.1 3.9 2.33 5.2 
Portland 12.7 6.2 2.05 6.5 
St. Louis 9.2 4.1 2.24 5.1 
Source: Same as Chart 6 
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Table 12 gives us a sharper profile of race and joblessness in the city of 
Milwaukee. Drawing on newly released data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census’ 
“2001 Supplementary Survey,” this table enables us to examine the 
unemployment and labor force exclusion rates, by race, for various age cohorts of 
the working-age population in the city of Milwaukee. Again, to avoid the analytic 
ambiguities involving gender and workforce participation, we limit this table to 
the male working-age population.    
Table 12: 
Unemployment and Labor Market Exclusion for Males, by Race and Age: 
City of Milwaukee, 2001 
Age Cohort Black 
Unemployment 
Rate 
White 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Black Labor 
Market 
Exclusion % 
White Labor 
Market 
Exclusion % 
16-19 48.1 17.9 71.3 55.2 
20-24 42.7 4.4 55.2 32.3 
25-54 18.6 5.0 29.0 13.0 
55-64 19.3 4.5 46.5 47.2 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Supplementary Survey, 2001. Summary tables. PCT0488. Sex by age by 
employment status for the population 16 years and over. Black or African-American alone, White alone, Not 
Hispanic or Latino.  
This table, perhaps more vividly than any other, conveys the seriousness of 
the crisis of race and unemployment facing the city of Milwaukee. In every age 
cohort, the black unemployment rate is in double-digits, and far exceeds the white 
unemployment rate. Over 40 percent of young, working-age black males (16-24) 
were unemployed in 2001, and over 60 percent were either unemployed or out of 
the labor force entirely. Even for prime working-age black males (25-54), the 
Milwaukee labor market is a grim place. The black unemployment rate for this 
cohort is 3.7 times higher than the white unemployment rate. Most astonishingly, 
in 2001 the unemployment rate for white male teenagers (17.9%) in the city of 
Milwaukee was lower than for prime working-age black males (18.6%). This 
statistic speaks volumes about racial disparities in the Milwaukee labor market 
and the extent to which joblessness – particularly male unemployment and labor 
market exclusion-- persists as a serious and chronic problem in Milwaukee’s 
African American community. 
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Policy Implications  
 
Jobs are the lifeblood of cities; without sufficient employment for residents, 
neighborhood decline is inevitable and sustainable neighborhood revitalization 
projects are impossible. As this report has documented, the city of Milwaukee in 
2003 faces an imposing array of labor market challenges: 
• A shrinking job base outside of downtown, anemic overall job 
growth, continuing deindustrialization, and declining numbers of 
employed residents; 
• An overall unemployment rate running significantly above the 
average of the nation’s largest cities; 
• A “spatial mismatch” in which high unemployment exists in the 
inner city, but all of the region’s net job growth is occurring in the 
suburbs (including many exurbs in Waukesha and Washington 
counties, far away from Milwaukee’s major pockets of 
unemployment); 
• A growing number of central city census tracts in which over half 
the working age males are not working; 
• The highest rates of black unemployment in large cities surveyed 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and among the highest racial 
disparities in unemployment rates of BLS-surveyed cities. 
There is, of course, no silver-bullet policy solution to Milwaukee’s 
employment crisis. But, it is clear that the policies of the past decade have not 
worked. Four brief examples: 
• Major investments such as the convention center or Miller Park 
have been sold as “job creation” policies, but as we have seen, the 
jobs have not materialized.8  
• Local community organizations have worked valiantly to retain 
and expand employment in their neighborhoods: the Northwest 
                                                 
8 This is hardly a surprise; there is a virtual consensus among academic researchers that neither sports facilities nor convention 
centers generate much economic development or create many jobs in cities. See Roger G. Noll and Andrew Zimbalist (eds), 
Sports, Jobs and Taxes: The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and Stadiums (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution 
Press, 1997); and Heywood Sanders, “Convention Myths and Markets: A Critical Review of Convention Center Feasibility 
Studies,” Economic Development Quarterly, 16:3, (August 2002): 195-210.   
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Side CDC’s “supplier-linkage” program and Esperanza Unida’s 
array of “social entrepreneurship” initiatives are fine examples. 
But community organization efforts have been overwhelmed when 
major city employers such as Tower Automotive, Master Lock, 
Johnson Controls and others lay off thousands or close their 
plants.  
• City government has put into place a number of useful programs: 
land-banking, TIFs, and various business assistance packages have 
all had varying degrees of success. But, the bottom line is that 
Milwaukee’s employment situation is worse today than it was in 
1990, and worse than the vast majority of big cities in the United 
States. Clearly, the city’s overall approach to job-creation is 
coming up short. 
• Until recently, the city’s major business organizations –the Greater 
Milwaukee Committee (GMC) and the Metropolitan Milwaukee 
Association of Commerce (MMAC)—only sporadically addressed 
the issue of job creation in the city of Milwaukee, particularly in 
the distressed neighborhoods of the inner city. Both organizations 
devoted considerable energies and played major roles in securing 
what will ultimately amount to over $1 billion in public funds to 
build a baseball stadium and convention center – dollars that could 
have been otherwise invested in more promising job-creation 
initiatives in the city. In the past year, both business organizations 
have become more active on the economic development and jobs 
front: the MMAC put out a “Blueprint for Prosperity” last fall, and 
the GMC is preparing to launch the “Initiative for a Competitive 
Inner City” (ICIC) this fall. But, there are few words in the 
MMAC “Blueprint” about massive inner city joblessness. The 
main focus is on “regional competitiveness,” and the strategies are 
largely drawn from the standard arsenal of business lobbying 
demands: lower taxes, less regulation, and improving the business 
climate. The ICIC project starts with the promising premise of job-
creation in sectoral “clusters” as the linchpin of inner city 
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neighborhood revitalization. However, it remains to be seen 
whether sufficient capital will be invested in the project to produce 
the kinds of job creation necessary to make even a dent in 
Milwaukee’s unemployment crisis. 
In sum, the performance of Milwaukee’s labor market over the past decade 
leaves little doubt that current policies –and the current generation of political 
and corporate leadership—have not successfully attacked the city’s employment 
crisis. Clearly, Milwaukee needs some radical, new approaches –a “big bang” of 
sorts—to jump-start the city’s job-creation machinery. In the interest of 
stimulating debate on new local job-growth strategies, we conclude this report 
with five policy possibilities:  
1) Public investment: Milwaukee’s labor market would improve 
dramatically with some good, old-fashioned Keynesian pump-priming. Like so 
many older U.S. cities, Milwaukee suffers from a crumbling infrastructure: aging 
schools, roads, and bridges badly in need of replacement and renovation. 
Improvements in public transportation –including some form of rail transit 
linking city neighborhoods to regional employment hubs (see below)—should 
also be part of Milwaukee’s renewed infrastructure. Major investments in 
renewed infrastructure would not only provide an immediate stimulus to the local 
job market, but would also contribute mightily to enhancing the long-term 
economic competitiveness of the city, making it attractive to employers (and thus 
contributing to long-term employment growth). Some of the funding for renewed 
infrastructure will come in the near future from state and federal transportation 
dollars, devoted to renewing the Milwaukee interstate system as well as possible 
improvements in public transportation. Some could come from creative use of the 
state and city’s bonding capacity. Where would additional funding for such a 
program come from? Read on. 
2) Regional Cooperation:  Although Milwaukee’s corporate leadership 
increasingly pays homage to the virtues of “regional cooperation,” concrete 
proposals for regional job creation are rare. Here’s one, drawn from Myron 
Orfield’s Wisconsin Metropatterns: a regional “tax-base sharing” program, 
modeled after the Twin Cities Fiscal Disparities program, in which local 
governments in the region contribute 40 percent of their growth in commercial-
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industrial tax base to a regional pool. The tax-base in the regional pool is then 
distributed back to local governments according to local tax base per capita. 
Orfield calculates that if such a program had been in place in the mid-1990s, 
Milwaukee could have received $1 billion in “tax base sharing funds.”9  While 
hardly enough to fund the multi-billion dollar public investment program 
suggested above, tax base sharing could certainly help fund critically needed job 
creation projects in Milwaukee’s inner city. Moreover, tax base sharing could 
also establish a framework for further regional economic cooperation, in 
transportation policy, “smart growth,” and “cluster-development” policies – all of 
which hold the potential for job-creation in the city and the region. 
3) Reduce Segregation in the Regional Labor Market: As we have noted, 
racial segregation is a fundamental feature of the Milwaukee labor market, 
contributing mightily to the “spatial mismatch” between job creation (the 
suburbs) and pockets of unemployment (the inner city). Breaking down 
segregated labor markets –by building affordable housing in the suburbs and by 
improving transportation links between the central city and suburban employment 
centers—must be a central component of any realistic strategy to reduce chronic 
inner city joblessness in Milwaukee. In this fashion, regional transportation and 
housing policies can be an integral part of a regional strategy to combat 
unemployment. Moreover, “smart growth” policies –providing incentives for 
employers to locate in existing employment centers and offering disincentives, 
such a steep impact fees, for development outside designated employment hubs-- 
can also improve access to regional jobs by city residents.  
4) City Industrial Policy: Milwaukee will never be the manufacturing 
colossus it was during its industrial heyday, but manufacturing remains –and will 
remain—an important part of the local job base. The city’s plans for a light-
manufacturing district in the Menomonee Valley are a promising start in 
developing a sorely needed local industrial strategy. Brownfields redevelopment, 
combined perhaps with “Smart Growth” incentives, also offers promise for some 
reindustrialization in the city. There are several training initiatives in place to 
                                                 
9 Myron Orfield and Thomas Luce, Wisconsin Metropatterns: Regional Cooperation, Economic Growth, and Environmental 
Protection (Minneapolis: MARC, 2002), p. 8. 
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prepare central city workers for employment in high-performance, high-
productivity manufacturing; these efforts should be strengthened as well.  
5) Community Benefits Agreements: As redevelopment continues in 
downtown Milwaukee and surrounding neighborhoods, the city should seek to 
maximize the employment possibilities for city residents. In several cities around 
the country, “community benefits agreements” (CBAs) have been attached to 
major redevelopment projects, in which city residents receive preferences in local 
hiring and developers receiving city subsidies –such as land write-downs, low-
interest loans, or TIFs—are required to meet certain job creation requirements. A 
CBA has been proposed for attachment to the city’s ambitious plans for 
redeveloping the Park East Corridor (on the northern edge of downtown where 
the Park East freeway was recently torn down). This CBA includes several 
provisions to enhance the job prospects of residents of low-income city 
neighborhoods to secure employment in the redevelopment zone, and may serve 
as a model for future CBAs, not only in the city but also perhaps throughout the 
region. 
These five policy approaches –public investment, regional cooperation, 
reduced segregation, industrial policy, and community benefits agreements—
hardly exhaust the range of new policies that could combat unemployment in 
Milwaukee. Moreover, although the current political climate would seem to make 
it unlikely, substantial aid from the state and federal governments will probably 
be necessary for Milwaukee to undertake a truly effective anti-unemployment 
strategy.  
But, the time has come for political and corporate leaders to acknowledge the 
seriousness of Milwaukee’s “stealth depression” and to recognize that “business 
as usual” has failed to combat the city’s structural employment crisis. These five 
policy approaches –or five other new departures—may serve as a useful starting 
point for rethinking city job-creation strategies. Let the debates begin. 
 
  
 
